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Media reports abound on instances of prolonged delays and excessive cost overruns in 
infrastructure projects. Only a small number of projects get delivered in time and within the 
budget. Examples of successful project implementation,  like construction of the  Delhi 
Metro Rail, are few and appear only far in between. Indeed, the problem of time and cost 
overruns in India is widespread and severe. Yet, very few empirical studies exist on the 
subject. Even rarer are the studies based on completed projects. As a result, the extents 
as well as the causes behind delays and cost overruns have remained under-researched.  
This study investigates the various issues related to delays and cost overruns in publically 
funded  infrastructure projects.  The following questions  are  posed  and answered: How 
common and how large are the time and  the  cost overruns? What are the essential 
causes behind these delays and cost overruns? Are the underlying causes statistically 
significant? Are Contractual and Institutional failures among the significant causes? What 
are the policy implications for planning, development and implementation of infrastructure 
projects? The study is based on, by far, the largest dataset of 894 projects from seventeen 
infrastructure sectors.  Among other results, it shows  that the contractual and the 
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1. Introduction  
 
Infrastructure projects in India are infamous for delays and cost overruns.  Recently 
commissioned, Bandra-Worli Sea Link amply demonstrates the state of project delivery 
system in the country. What was planned as a Rs 300 Crore project to be completed by 
2004 has actually cost Rs 1,600 crore along with a delay of five years. Indeed, very few 
projects get delivered in time and on cost. The delays and cost overruns have become 
hallmark of infrastructure  projects in India. The  quarterly reports of the Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI) stand testimony to a saga of unfettered 
delays and cost overruns. Yet, the extents and the causes behind the time and the cost 
overruns have remained understudied.  As a result, the types of the policy interventions 
required to rectify the malady have also remained unidentified.  
 
Delays and cost overruns have significant implications from economic as well as political 
point of view. Due to delays in project implementation, the people and the economy have 
to wait for the provisions of public goods and services longer than is necessary. Thus, 
delays limit  the growth potential of the economy.  Similarly, cost overruns reduce 
competitiveness of the economy. Services provided by infrastructure projects serve as input 
for other sectors of the economy. Cost overruns in these projects lead to an increase in the 
capital-output-ratio for the entire economy. Simply put, delays and cost overruns reduce the 
efficiency of available economic  resources and limit the growth potential of the entire 
economy. Moreover, at least as of now, most infrastructure projects in India are funded by 
taxpayers’ money. Therefore, taxpayers have right to know about how efficiently their 
money is utilized by officials while making provisions of public goods and services. In the 
absence of proper identification and understanding of the underlying causes behind delays 
and cost overruns, there is a risk that the perceptions will take over and misguide the policy 
making. For instance, the perception that the public sector is incapable of delivering public 
goods in time and on cost, may lead to excessive privatization of infrastructure and other 
public services. Indeed, inadequacy of research on the subject is somewhat surprising and a 
gross neglect of an important public policy subject. 
 
The absence of comprehensive India centric studies apart, there exists a large body of 
theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. It suggests that delays and cost overruns 
are generic to infrastructure projects and a global phenomenon; India in not an exception. 
However, the literature also reveals that the underlying causes and, therefore, the remedies 
differ from country to country. Therefore, there is only so much that can be learnt from 
international experience, further underscoring the need for a systematic India-based study. 
In any case, as I will demonstrate in Section 3, the international literature is not helpful at 
all in explaining the nature of delays and cost overruns observed in India. In contrast, 
several works of Indian scholars have made interesting contributions. However, very few 
of these works are empirical studies; most of them are case studies. No doubt case studies 
are very helpful in explaining particular instances but have limited capacity to educate us 
about the intrinsic problems besetting the infrastructure delivery system. A review of the 
existing literature along with its limitations is provided in Section 3.  In sum, the main 
causes behind time and cost overruns in India and their statistical  significance have 
remained unsubstantiated.  
 
In this backdrop, it is somewhat disquieting that the privatization of public services is 
believed to be the only way out. Indeed, the problems of delays and cost overruns with the  
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official delivery system are being used to rationalize privatization of the supply and the 
maintenance of infrastructure services. The government machinery is perceived to be 
incapable of procuring and maintaining infrastructure facilities inefficiently. Privatization 
in the form of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), in contrast, is believed to be capable of 
avoiding delays and cost overruns.  Several commentators and policy makers share this 
view.  So, PPPs are being pushed as politically acceptable channel for  transferring 
management and control rights over infrastructure facilities to private firms. It is worth 
quoting an excerpt of a decision made in a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister:
1
In the above quote the BOT model means the PPP model. In contrast, publically funded 
projects are executed through EPC contracts, popularly known as cash contracts. The BOT 
contracts are recommended as the preferred means for constructing national highways in 
various other official reports also.
 
“As regards the issue of EPC vs BOT, it was agreed that for ensuring provision of better road 
services, i.e., higher quality of construction and maintenance of roads and completion of 
projects without cost and time overrun, contracts based on BOT model are inherently 
superior to the traditional EPC contracts. Accordingly, it was decided that for NHDP Phase-III 
onwards, all contracts for provisions of road services would be awarded only on BOT basis...”  
 
2 In other sectors too there is tendency to privatize the 
supply and the management of infrastructure services, ostensibly to overcome the cost and 
other perceived inefficiencies of the public sector. Though, the nature and the extent of 
privatization differs from sector to sector.
3
Our results imply that a change in the ownership in itself cannot mitigate the problems of 
delays and cost overruns. Moreover, the recent experiences with PPPs suggest that private 




The econometric analysis shows that since early 1980s there has been significant decline in 
time and cost overruns. However, delays and cost overruns still are too frequent  and 
unacceptably  large.  Across sectors, bigger projects are much more vulnerable to cost 
overruns.  Ceteris paribus, delays and cost overruns are considerably higher for road, 
 
Inevitably, most provisions of public goods will still have to be funded and executed 
through the traditional official machinery. At the same time, given the fiscal constraints 
faced by the Center and the State governments, public funding of infrastructure projects is 
under serious strain. Therefore, it is extremely important to improve the official delivery 
system for infrastructure projects, so as to minimize the wastage. Clearly, the remedy 
depends on the underlying causes.  This  paper, among other things, investigates  the 
underlying causes for time and cost overruns observed in India. 
 
The following four features set this study apart. First, it is based on by far the largest 
dataset on completed projects. The database includes 894 projects completed during April 
1992-March 2009. It covers seventeen infrastructure sectors. Second, it explores the factors 
that can trigger delay and/or cost overruns during the planning, the contracting and the 
implementation phases of infrastructure projects. Third, it examines the nature of causal 
relationships for time and cost overruns along with their statistical significance. Fourth, it 
shows that there is simultaneity between delays and cost overruns. Therefore, it uses a 
simultaneous equations model to study them.   
 
                                                 
1 The meeting regarding financing of NHDP was held on March 15, 2005. See GoI (2006 a).  
2 Report of the Core Group on financing of NHDP (2006, pp. 14 and 18) published by the Secretariat for the 
Committee on Infrastructure.  
3 See Kundu (2001), Nagaraj (2006), Goyal (2008), and GoI (2007). 
4 For an analysis of PPPs in road sector, see Anant and Singh (2009).  
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railways, urban-development, civil aviation, shipping and ports, and power sector projects. 
There are some regional variations with respect to the extent of delays and cost overruns. 
However, contrary to the common perception, the performance of rich states is no better 
than that of the poorer states. 
 
With respect to the underlying causes, I show that several hitherto neglected factors are 
among the major causes behind delays and cost overruns observed in India. Specifically, a 
deficient project planning, use of inappropriate procurement contracts and faulty contract 
management are some of the leading and statistically significant causes. Several kinds of 
organizational-cum-institutional failures also greatly add to time and cost overruns. 
Besides, the contractual and the institutional differences across sectors are the keys to the 
understanding of the observed differences regarding delays and cost overruns. 
 
I must hasten to add that despite the above-mentioned distinguishing features  and the 
generality of the study, it is not meant to be an omniscient account of delays and cost 
overruns. It has several limitations. For instance, infrastructure sectors are quite different in 
terms of the project types. Therefore, for each sector there are idiosyncratic factors that can 
cause delay and cost overruns. The present study does not explore such factors. This and 
other limitations are discussed in the following sections.  Section 2 presents an overview of 
the delays and cost overruns in infrastructure projects. Section 3 shows that the existing 
literature is inadequate to explain the time and cost overruns observed in India. Section 4, 
proposes and analyses various possible factors that can cause delays and cost overruns. The 
model and regression results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes with 
the findings and the policy implications.  
 
 
2. Delays and Cost Overruns in India 
 
Definitions: Every infrastructure project has to undergo several stages: from planning of 
the project, to its approval, to awarding of contract(s), to actual construction/procurement, 
and so on. Broadly put, a project’s lifecycle has three phases; development, construction, 
and operation-and-maintenance phase. See Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 1: 






In the beginning of the development phase, the project sponsoring department prepares 
estimates of time and cost (funds) needed to complete the project. An expected date of 
completion is also announced. The actual date of completion is invariably different from 
the expected date. We define ‘time overrun’ as the time difference between the actual and 
the initially planned (i.e, expected) dates of completion.
5
                                                 
5 In the terminology of MOSPI, the former is known as the actual date of commissioning and the latter as the 
original date of commissioning. 
 The time difference is measured 
in months. A related term used in the paper is the ‘implementation phase’  or 
‘implementation period’. It is defined as the duration in which a project is planned to be 
completed, i.e., the duration between the date of approval of the project and its expected 






Maintenance Phase   
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date of completion. Therefore, for each project we can define percentage time overrun as 
the ratio of the time overrun and the implementation phase for the project (multiplied by 
one hundred). Clearly, the time overrun and therefore the percentage time overrun can be 
positive, zero or even negative. Similarly, we define ‘cost overrun’ as the difference 
between the actual cost and the initially projected (i.e., expected) cost of the projects. The 
initially expected cost is called the initial project cost. This is the estimated cost of project 
works. It is estimated when a project is planned and generally is arrived at using current 
input prices. The actual cost becomes known only at the time of completion at the end of 
phase two. Percentage cost overrun for a project is defined as the ratio of the cost overrun 
and the initially projected cost of the project (multiplied by one hundred).    Again, 
percentage cost overrun can be positive, zero or negative.  
 
The Data  and  Summary Statistics:  The programme implementation  division of the 
MOSPI publishes quarterly reports on the ongoing projects. Each quarterly report also  
 
TABLE 1: Total number of projects 895. 
S. 
No. 
ASPECT  DESCRIPTION  DATA SOURCE 
1  DATE OF PROJECT 
START 
It is the start date of the project  MOSPI reports 
2  INITIAL DATE OF 
COMMISSIONING  
It is the initially planned (i.e, expected) date of completion of 
the project 
MOSPI reports 
3  ACTUAL DATE OF 
COMMISSIONING  
It is the actual dates of completion of the project  MOSPI reports 
4  TIMEOVERRUN  The time difference  (in months)  between the actual and the 
initially planned dates of completion 
OUR CALCULATIONS  based 
on the data collected from 
MOSPI reports. 
.  
5  IMPLEMENTATION 
PHASE 
The duration in which a project is planned to be completed, i.e., 
the duration between the date of approval of the project and its 
expected date of completion. 
OUR CALCULATIONS  based 
on the data collected from 
MOSPI reports. 
 
6  PCTIMEOVERRUN 
(% time overrun) 
The ratio of the time overrun and the implementation phase for 
the project (multiplied by one hundred). 
OUR CALCULATIONS  based 
on the data collected from 
MOSPI reports. 
7  INITIAL PROJECT 
COST 
The initially projected (i.e., expected) cost of the project.  MOSPI reports 
8  ACTUAL PROJECT 
COST 
The actual cost at the time of completion of the project.  MOSPI reports 
9  COST OVERRUN  The difference between the actual cost and the initially 
projected (i.e., expected) cost of the project. 
OUR CALCULATIONS  based 
on the data collected from 
MOSPI reports. 
 
10  PCCOSTOVERRUN 
(% cost overrun) 
The ratio of the cost overrun and the initially anticipated cost of 
the project (multiplied by one hundred). 
OUR CALCULATIONS  based 
on the data collected from 
MOSPI reports. 
11  TIMELAPSE  It is the time (in months) that has lapsed since May 1974 to the 
date of approval of the project. The first project in our dataset 
was approved in May 1974. 
OUR CALCULATIONS  based 
on the data collected from 
MOSPI reports. 
12  SECTOR  The infrastructure sector to which the project belongs  MOSPI reports 
13  STATE  The state in which the project is located.  MOSPI reports and publications 
of the Ministry relevant for the 
Sector 
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provides some information about the projects that get completed in that quarter. According 
to these reports, during April 1992-March 2009, a total of 1035 projects belonging to 
seventeen infrastructure sectors have been completed. Most of these are publically funded 
and managed projects; only few road projects are PPPs. Each project is worth at least Rs 20 
Crore.  
 
TABLE 2  Summary Statistics:  Delays and cost overruns in infrastructure projects during 
April1992-March 2009.  


























Atomic Energy  12  15.05  113.12  25.00  301.02  570.48  91.67  8.33 
Civil Aviation  47  -2.27  40.52  42.55  68.52  58.15  91.49  0.00 
Coal  95  -19.90  73.85  22.11  31.05  69.28  61.05  3.16 
Fertilizers  16  -12.57  28.92  25.00  26.53  41.80  62.50  12.50 
Finance  1  132.91  0  100.00  302.78  0  100.00  0.00 
Health and 
family Welfare  2  302.30  92.96  100.00  268.04  208.63  100.00  0.00 
I & B  7  14.00  62.97  42.86  206.98  140.57  100.00  0.00 
Mines  5  -33.16  20.65  0.00  42.44  36.23  80.00  0.00 
Petrochemicals  3  -12.22  25.92  33.33  74.43  3.05  100.00  0.00 
Petroleum  123  -16.10  28.96  20.33  37.57  49.60  79.67  2.44 
Power  107  51.94  272.50  46.73  33.57  55.15  60.75  5.61 
Railways  122  94.84  178.86  82.79  118.08  141.71  98.36  0.00 
Road Transport 
and Highways  157  15.84  62.46  54.14  50.21  56.86  85.35  6.37 
Shipping and 
Ports  61  -1.35  84.35  31.15  118.64  276.79  95.08  1.64 
Steel  43  -15.88  47.78  18.60  49.91  60.67  81.40  4.65 
Telecommunica
tion  69  -32.09  57.59  15.94  238.24  259.34  91.30  0.00 
Urban 
Development  24  12.31  50.27  41.67  66.44  44.58  100.00  0.00 
Total  894  15.17  132.27  40.72  79.25  153.51  82.33  3.13 
Source: Calculations based on MOSPI data. 
 
The quarterly reports are a rich source of information. But, unfortunately, no single report 
or any other official document provides all the information needed to determine the time 
and the cost overruns, and the implementation phase.  The information on the  other 
relevant aspects such as the location and the nature of project work is even harder to obtain. 
In order to collect the required information, each project had to be tracked at various stages, 
such as the project development, construction and completion stages. That meant that for 
each project we had to wade through several reports and other publications. Still, the 
required information could be obtained for only 894 projects; for the remaining 141 
projects, information on one or the other aspect was missing. These missing projects were 
started in seventies and early eighties.  Nonetheless, it is the largest dataset on completed  
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projects for any study on the subject by far.  For each of 894 projects, we have collected 
and compiled data on the aspects mentioned in Table 1. Sector-wise summary statistics are 
provided in Table 2.  
 
As is evident from Table 2, there are wide-ranging variations across sectors in terms of 
average delays, cost overruns, and standard deviations. Within each sector also there are 
large variations with respect to the magnitude of time and cost overruns. Similar is the case 
with respect to the types of activities covered by projects. Again, projects are quite diverse 
across as well as within sectors. Yet, projects in road, railways and urban-development 
sectors are more homogeneous; most are construction projects. Majority of projects in civil 
aviation, shipping and ports, and power sectors also involve construction and the related 
activities. In contrast, in sectors like telecom and atomic energy, a large number of projects 
are for purchase and/or installation of equipments. There are some construction projects 
too. Similarly, project type in petroleum, petrochemicals and mining, etc., is very 
heterogeneous. For analytical convenience, projects have been clubbed in the following 
five  somewhat  homogeneous categories: First category is of road, railways and urban-
development projects; Second, civil aviation,  shipping and  ports,  and power projects; 
Third, telecom and atomic energy; Fourth, petroleum and petrochemicals; Fifth, all other 
projects. The rational behind this categorization is provided in Section 4. 
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Time Pattern of Delays and Cost Overruns: To repeat, the project cost and the project 
time vary significantly from project to project, across sectors as well as within each sector. 
Therefore, for comparisons to be meaningful it is important to consider delays and cost 
overruns in percentage rather than in absolute terms. Using the above definitions, 
percentage time and cost overruns have been calculated for each project. Graph 1 depicts 
the trend of percentage time overruns. The percentage time overrun for a project is plotted 
against the year in which the project started. Similarly, Graph 2 shows the movements of 
percentage cost overruns over the years. Together these graphs show that since 1980s the 
official delivery system has improved somewhat. The magnitudes of cost overruns seem to 
have come down over the years. However, the decline in delays is less obvious. Moreover, 
cost overruns are still too frequent and unacceptably large. According to the latest MOSPI 
report, as on March 31, 2009, more than one-third of the ongoing projects are experiencing 
cost overruns. Collectively, cost overruns for these projects are huge at Rs 73791.51 crore; 
which is 54.75 percent of their original cost and 13.45 percent of the cost of all projects. 
From another perspective, the cost overruns in the ongoing projects are larger than the three 
consecutive fiscal packages announced during 2008-09! Similarly, delays are too frequent 
and at times intolerably long. Out of 925 ongoing projects, 445 have already experienced 
delays.   
 
3. The Literature and the Indian Scenario 
 
The literature on delays and cost overruns is fairly large. In a series of interesting empirical 
studies covering twenty countries across the five continents, Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl 
(2002, 2003, and 2004) have shown that infrastructure projects often suffer from cost  
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overruns.
6 Merewitz (1973), Kain (1990), Pickrell (1990), Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997), 
among others, have also come out with similar findings. In addition, there are numerous 
case studies depicting the extent and gravity of delays and cost overruns.
7
As Graphs 1 and 2 show, over the years there has been some decline in the magnitudes of 
estimation errors only with respect to project cost. That is, some learning seems to have 
taken place over the years. To that extent, cost overruns in India seem to have been caused 
by the technological constraints. Nonetheless, for most sectors the errors for cost estimates 
are anything but unbiased with  zero mean.  Moreover, there is no indication of any 
significant decline in the frequency of delays. Table 2 shows that barring a few sectors 
average delays are nowhere close to zero. For most sectors, estimation errors for project 
time have remained biased with large positive mean. Similarly, errors in cost estimates are 
large and biased. Altogether, at least 82 percent of the projects under study have suffered 
from either delays or cost overruns. As we discussed earlier, the current situation is no 
better. Therefore, at least, in the case of India, the imperfect information and technological 
constraints cannot fully explain  the observed  delays and cost overruns. Similarly, the 
theory of ‘lying’ by politicians does not seem to hold the key. In principle, cost overruns do 
not necessarily imply time overruns; once a project has been approved by the people or 
their representatives, more funds can be commissioned to ensure timely completion. After 
all, politicians would want to take credit for faster completion of projects. Even otherwise, 
 However, these 
empirical works do not explain why delays and cost overruns occur.   
 
But, the theoretical literature on the subject offers several explanations. For example, 
Morris and Hough (1987), Arvan and Leite (1990), Gaspar and Leite (1989) and Ganuza 
(2007) attribute  delays and cost overruns to imperfect information and technical 
constraints. According to these studies, due to imperfect estimation techniques and the lack 
of data, the estimated and the actual project costs turn out to be different. That is, delays 
and cost overruns are claimed to be a manifestation of ‘honest’ mistakes on the part of 
government officials. Another strand of the literature attributes cost escalations to political 
factors, i.e., to ‘lying’ by politicians. See, for example, Wachs, 1989; Kain, 1990; Pickrell, 
1990; Morris, 1990; Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, 2002; and Flyvbjerg,  Holm and Buhl, 
2004, among others. According to these works, politicians understate costs and exaggerate 
benefits in order to make projects saleable.  
 
However, if time and cost overruns are only due to the imperfect estimation techniques, 
then one would expect the estimation errors to be ‘small’ compared to project cost, and 
unbiased with zero mean. Since, due to technological constraints, underestimation of cost 
should be as likely as overestimation. As a result, in each sector negative cost overruns 
should be as frequent as positive cost overruns. Moreover, as more and more projects get 
implemented, the officials should be able to learn from the past mistakes and avoid them in 
future. On top of it, the estimation technology also advances with the passage of time. That 
is, over the years, the institutional capacity of government departments to plan and develop 
projects improves, as policy-makers move up learning curve. Therefore, the frequency as 
well as the magnitude of delays and cost overruns should come down over the years.  
 
                                                 
6 The authors have studied 258 mega infrastructure projects from 20 countries including developed as well as 
developing countries. They have shown that ninety  percent of large transport  projects  suffer from cost 
overruns. 
7 For example, Suez canal was constructed at costs three times of the estimated cost. The cost overrun for 
Panama Canal was in the range of 70-200 percent. Similarly, for the Concorde supersonic airplane project, 
the actual costs were 12 times the projected costs (Flyvbjerg et al, 2002 ). For more case studies see Pickrell, 
1990; Skamris and Flyvbjerg, 1997; Kain, 1990; among others.  
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in India projects are planned by bureaucrats who need not please people, and politicians are 
not known to effectively control bureaucracy. To sum up, the existing theoretical literature 
cannot explain the features of delays and cost overruns observed in India. Moreover, it has 
focused only on the development phase and has totally ignored the relevant factors arising 
in the implementation phase. See Figure 1. As the following section shows, even for the 
first phase the literature has ignored some crucial underlying causes. 
 
In contrast, several India-focused studies have made limited but interesting contributions. 
Morris (1990 and 2003), Dalvi (1997), Thomas (2000), Sriraman (2003), Thomsen (2006), 
Jonston and Santillo (2007), and Raghuram, Bastian and Sundaram (2009), among others, 
are notable works. According to these studies, delays in land acquisition, shifting of 
utilities, environmental and inter-ministerial clearances, shortage of funds, litigations over 
land acquisition and contractual disputes  are the major causes behind time and cost 
overruns in India.
 8
As  has been mentioned  before, during the development phase, the  project sponsoring 
department prepares the estimates of project works as well as of the time and the cost 
(funds) needed to complete project works. These estimates are approved by the appropriate 
authority in the department. In addition, a project generally requires approval from several 
other departments.
 However, these studies too have some serious limitations. Very few of 
these are empirical works. Though there are some empirical works, but they have become 
somewhat dated by now. Moreover, rather than studying the completed projects, they have 
used data for  the  then ongoing  projects (See, for example, Morris, 1990; and 2003).  
Therefore, these studies are based on the estimates, rather than the actual figures for the 
time and the cost overruns. For infrastructure projects, the estimated and the actual figures 
for delays and cost overruns are invariably different; in some cases considerably so.  As our 
results  will demonstrate, these studies have ignored several  crucial  underlying causes 
behind delays and cost overruns.  
 
4. Delays and Cost Overruns in India: Possible Causes and Proxies 
 
9  In the  beginning of the next, that is, the construction or the 
implementation phase  a  contract  is signed  between the sponsoring department and a 
contractor.
10
                                                 
8 Besides, there are several interesting studies with a focus on the operation-and-maintenance phase of 
infrastructure projects. For a comprehensive account of various challenges faced by urban-development 
projects see Kundu (2001 and 2003), also see Banerjee-Guha (2009). Goyal (2008) provides an enlightening 
discussion on the problems faced by railways and civil aviation sectors. These works show that privatization 
itself has not delivered the expected results in urban-development and civil aviation sectors. For a discussion 
on power sector see Nagaraj (2006).  
9 For example, a typical civil aviation project needs clearances from the ministries of civil aviation, finance, 
environment and forest, and the Airport Authority of India. 
10 Generally, the contractor is selected through competitive bidding. 
  Depending on  the context, the contract can be  for construction or for 
procurement of equipments or both. During this second phase, timely completion of the 
project often requires active cooperation from the sponsoring authority, the contractor(s) 
and several other departments. Therefore, whether a project can be delivered in time and on 
cost depends on how well the activities and efforts of the departments involved and the 
individuals concerned are coordinated. The activities and efforts of the parties involved are 
governed by two different modes of governance. The activities  of the contractors  are 
governed by market contracts  signed between the sponsoring department and the 
contractor. As will be shown in the following, the nature of the contract and subsequently 
its enforcement have profound implications for delays and cost overruns. On the other 
hand, efforts of the officials involved in project planning and implementation are governed  
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by the organizational structure of the government departments. Government organizations 
are hierarchical in nature. Hierarchy based organizations are inherently weak in inducing 
the  desired efforts from individuals  concerned. The problem is acuter for government 
organizations. Therefore, both contractual and organizational  modes  of governance are 
subject to failures. In the following, I discuss what kind of contractual and organizational 
failures are major causes of delays and cost overruns in India. For the ease of exposition, it 
is helpful to divide the set of possible causes in the following subgroups.  
 
Technical and Natural Factors: The estimation of project time and cost for infrastructure 
projects is a characteristically complex exercise. Though the estimation techniques have 
become better and sophisticated in recent times, they are still imperfect. As work on a 
project starts, its future unfolds and the authorities along with the contractor become better 
informed about the specific technological and material requirements of the project works. 
For example, during construction phase of a road project, an unexpectedly poor quality of 
soil may necessitate changes in the engineering, the design and the quality of bitumen 
required, from what were initially planned. Such changes may require extra time as well as 
funds. In some cases the actual circumstances, in contrast, may turn out to be favourable 
and the parties may find that they had made excessive provisions of funds and time. 
Similarly, flood or any other event of force majeure may cause delay as well as destroy the 
project assets. Alternatively, the natural conditions may turn out to be rather conducive, 
saving construction time and  costs.  Therefore, due to imperfect estimation and natural 
factors the actual project time and cost will generally be different from their expected 
values. 
 
However, one would expect the effects of the technical and natural factors to be random 
without any bias. Also, due to the above-discussed learning-by-doing among officials, both 
the delays and the cost overrun would be expected to come down over the years.  
Therefore, if the decline in the delays and cost overruns over the years turns out to be 
statistically significant, we can attribute some of the delays and cost overruns to the 
technical and natural constraints.  To confirm whether this is the case, for each project we 
have calculated the TIMELAPSE. It is the time that has lapsed since May 1974 to the date 
of approval of the project. The first project in our dataset was approved in May 1974. 
Ceteris paribus, the longer is TIMELAPSE for a project the lower should be time and cost 
overruns. However, as they move up the learning curve, learning among officials and its 
efficacy in reducing delays and cost overruns will come down. By the same account, the 
effects of policy interventions are expected to decline over time. Therefore, starting from 
mid-seventies, percentage delays and cost overruns are expected to have come down over 
time, but at a ‘decreasing rate’. Formally, the variable TIMELAPSE is expected to have a 
quadratic relation with time and cost overruns.  
 
 The Contractual Failures: As discussed before, the construction phase of an infrastructure 
project starts with signing of a construction/procurement contract.  In terms of Figure 1, the 
contract is signed  between the authority (employer) and the contractor  at date t=1.  It 
specifies the works that are to be performed, or the good that is to be delivered by the 
contractor. The degree of precision in this initial contract has direct implications for cost 
overruns. Suppose the initial contract is contingency-complete in that it fully specifies all 
the works that are to be carried out in each possible contingency that may arise during the 
construction phase. Under such a contract, cost overruns can be avoided altogether. Since 
every contingency has been completely planned for, no additional (un-specified) work is 
ever required. Now, if the initial cost is determined for each contingency, there will be no 
cost overruns. Moreover, the contract price can be fixed or can be contingency specific. In  
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either case, the parties’ obligations have already been spelt out fully. No ‘additional’ 
payment is required to be made by the either party. In fact, delays on the part of contractor 
can  also  be avoided with the  help of suitable penalty clauses.  Therefore, in principle, 
complete-contingent-contracts  can ensure that project is completed in time and within 
(contingency-specific) budget.  
 
In reality, the initial contract cannot be complete. Parties cannot predict every possible 
scenario that may unfold during the construction phase. As a result, the initial contract 
cannot completely specify every relevant aspect of the project works; different states of 
nature  during construction  require different modifications in the project  works.  For 
example, on a railways project depending on the local conditions, it may become necessary 
to have more of manned-crossings or railway-over-bridges than were initially intended.  
The bounded rationality of the parties along with imperfect forecasting techniques makes it 
impossible to specify every contingency and the relevant tasks to the last details. As a 
result, the initial contract leaves out several project works.  This is especially true of 
infrastructure projects, which are inherently  complex and have long building  phase. 
Formally speaking, the  initial  contracts  for  infrastructure projects  are intrinsically 
‘incomplete’. Once the contractor starts the work at the project site and the future unfolds, 
the need for additional works arises invariably. Additional works require more funds and 
hence cause cost overruns. In some cases, extra time is also needed. So, some of the cost 
overruns are caused by what we have called the contractual incompleteness.  
 
Construction projects are typically more complex and therefore more difficult to plan and 
execute than is the case with non-construction projects, say, those involving purchase of 
equipments. So, the degree of incompleteness of the initial contracts is expected to be 
higher for construction projects. As clarified in Section 2, most projects in Road, Railways 
and  Urban-development sectors are construction projects. Majority of projects in Civil 
Aviation, Shipping and Ports, and Power sectors too involve construction and are complex 
even otherwise.  Each project  in these  latter sectors is generally unique in terms of its 
requirements. So, learning from previous projects is limited. If our claim about the causal 
relation between the contractual incompleteness and the cost overruns is correct, the cost 
overruns experienced by projects in the above sectors should be significantly larger than by 
other sector projects. The next section shows that this indeed is the case. 
 
The  contractual incompleteness is  expected  to increase with the  project size. Since, 
compared to smaller ones, bigger projects involve more works. Besides, big projects are 
generally more complex than the smaller ones. It is plausible to argue that the contractual 
incompleteness increases with the project size. Therefore, the resulting cost overruns are 
also  expected to grow  with the project size.  The initially expected project cost 
(INITIALCOST) is a good measure of project size, its complexity, and hence  of  the 
contractual  incompleteness.
11  So,  cost overruns are also expected to swell with the 
INITIALCOST, at least in absolute terms. But, what can we say about the percentage cost 
overruns across projects? For a given degree of contractual incompleteness, percentage cost 
overruns need not increase with the project size.
12
                                                 
11 Please note the initially expected project cost, rather than the actual cost, is a better indicator of the size and 
incompleteness of the contract. Due to cost overrun, the final cost can be large even for small projects. The 
same argument applies to the implementation phase.  
  
12 To take an example, suppose a project is worth Rs 100 crore. But, the initial contract misses out on say ten 
percent of relevant work. As a result, there are cost overruns of Rs 10 crore. Take another same-sector project 
that is worth Rs 200 crore. This bigger project may show higher cost overruns of Rs 20 crore. But, percentage 
cost overrun for both projects is the same; 10 percent. Of course, as complexity of a project increases, it  
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However, if project planning is poor, cost overruns can increase with project size not only 
in absolute but also in percentage terms. To see why, first of all note that the initial contract 
can be made more or less incomplete by the parties involved. If project planning is bad and 
apathetic, estimates of project time and cost will be vague  and  so will be the initial 
contract. As a result, many un-contracted for works will become necessary later on, leading 
to high cost overruns. In contrast, a meticulous planning in terms of technical and material 
requirements of the project can enable the parties to stipulate most of work details in the 
initial contract itself.  This, in turn, means  less frequent and  lower cost overruns. The 
problem, however, is that careful planning is a tedious work. Planning of big and complex 
projects requires all the more of painstaking and drawn out efforts. If there is no 
accountability, the officials will  have no incentives to put in the desired efforts at the 
planning and contracting stages. Certainly, quality of efforts put in will not increase in sync 
with the project size and its complexity. Since, bigger projects entail not only more works 
but also more complex ones; the initial contracts for bigger projects will become more 
incomplete. This, in turn, means a larger proportion of additional, uncontracted for, works 
will have to be undertaken during the construction phase. To sum up, if project planning is 
sloppy, the greater is the project size and its complexity, the higher will be the proportion 
of project works that gets left out of the initial contract. So, if project planning is defective, 
the greater is the project size the larger will be the cost overruns.  
 
Project planning processes in India are infamous for their ad-hoc and shoddy approach. 
Detailed project reports (DPRs) as well as feasibility reports are sloppy and vague, 
prepared only for the sake of formality.
13 This problem is further exacerbated by the use of 
unit-price EPC contracts. Under these contracts neither the officials nor the contractors find 
it worth haggling over work  details.
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Yet another aspect of infrastructure projects suggests itself as a proxy for the size. It is the 
implementation phase or IMPLPHASE for short;  the duration  in which the project is 
initially planned to be completed. Intuitively, the implementation phase will increase with 
the project size. If so, the initial project cost and the implementation phase should be highly 
correlated. It is instructive to note that in our dataset these two variables are not correlated 
at all; correlation coefficient is just 0.067! There can be at least two reasons for this lack of 
correlation. May be it is yet another manifestation of poor project planning in India. But, it 
could well be due to the large heterogeneity in terms of the project types. Many projects in 
our dataset are for purchase/procurement of machines and equipments. For such projects, 
there is no reason for IMPLPHASE to increase in proportion to the project cost (i.e., with 
  On this count also, contractual incompleteness 
increases with project size.  
 
If the above arguments regarding the deficient project planning in India are the consequent 
contractual are correct, the percentage cost overruns should increase with the project size. 
Therefore, we have another testable hypothesis: the greater is the initial costs, the larger is 
the percentage cost overrun, and vice-versa. The next section shows that this claim too is 
valid.   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
becomes more difficult to provide every minute detail in the initial contract. For an accessible account of 
incomplete contracts see Hart (1995). 
13 See Lok Sabha (2006) and LEA (2008). 
14 Under unit-price EPC contracts, the contractor gets paid based on the quantities of inputs used. Therefore, 
he does not have to worry too much about details of material requirements.   
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the cost of the equipments). To that extent the IMPLPHASE perhaps is not a very good 
indicator of the (money) size of the project. So, the weak correlation is not surprising.  
 
Plausibly any increase in complexity of the project as well as the number of construction 
works should entail an increase in the IMPLPHASE  for the project. That is, the 
IMPLPHASE appears to be a very good indicator of the complexity and the quantum of 
project works.  Therefore, it is a good proxy for the incompleteness of the initial contract. 
Also, note than the above arguments regarding the implications of poor project planning 
are more pertinent for complex, say, construction related projects than for simple 
procurement projects which involve purchase of standard machines and equipments. It is 
worth emphasising that the proxy INITIALCOST does not make this crucial distinction. 
Besides, uncertainties related to the appropriateness of initially planned works naturally 
increase with time. Therefore, due to poor planning an undue increase in IMPLPHASE can 
cause excessive cost overruns by necessitating many more changes during the construction 
phase. If the above arguments are correct, the percentage cost overruns should increase 
with the IMPLPHASE, on account of the contractual failures caused by the poor project 
planning. To sum up, between the INITIALCOST and the IMPLPHASE, the latter appears 
to be a better and direct indicator of contractual incompleteness as well as of the 
contractual failures. So, we have one more testable prediction: ceteris paribus, the longer is 
longer IMPLPHASE, the higher are the cost overruns, in absolute as well as percentage 
terms. 
 
But, what is the nature of relationship between INITIALCOST and IMPLPHASE, on one 
hand, and delays, on the other hand? The above discussion suggests that an increase in 
IMPLPHASE may lead to longer delays. However, ceteris paribus, projects with longer 
IMPLPHASE have already got more time to complete project works than projects with 
shorter duration. On top of it, longer IMPLPHASE projects have greater flexibility for 
accommodating additional works. Therefore, they should show relatively small percentage 
of time overruns. For instance, between the two same-type and same-cost projects, the one 
with longer IMPLPHASE should show lower time overrun. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we 
expect  the  percentage  time overrun to come down as implementation phase increases. 
Similarly, it seems plausible to expect the absolute time overrun to increase with initial 
cost, but,  ceteris paribus,  there is no reason to expect time overrun to increase in 
percentage terms.     
 
Organizational or Institutional Failures:  As argued above, execution of infrastructure 
projects requires active cooperation of several departments within as well as among various 
ministries.  Government departments are hierarchical organizations.   A large body of 
literature shows  that  there is a conflict between the  individual and the  organizational 
objectives at every stage of hierarchy. As a result, hierarchical organizations are inherently 
weak in inducing the desired efforts from the people involved.
15
                                                 
15 Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). 
  This is especially true of 
government organizations.  Therefore, infrastructure projects have to face the consequences 
of organizational failures within the sponsoring ministry itself. On top of it, these projects 
need joint efforts of several other organizations. In India, different departments  are 
responsible for different project activities. For example, project implementation, shifting of 
power lines, water lines, sewer lines, cutting of trees, environmental clearances and other 
such activities are performed by different departments. Executions of these activities are 
highly dependent on joint and timely efforts of the departments involved. However, 
interdependence of efforts means that it is easy for departments to shirk and pass the blame  
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on others. So, in addition to intra-organizational failures, infrastructure projects in India are 
vulnerable to inter-organization  failures.  Several  reports, including the official ones, 
corroborate our claims.
16
As  mentioned earlier, most projects in road, railways and  urban-development  are 
construction projects. Projects in these sectors generally require environmental clearance 
from the central as well as the state agencies. Moreover, compared to those in the other 
sectors, these projects require much more active cooperation of several departments for 
land/property acquisition, shifting of power lines, water lines, sewer lines, approval of 
under or over-passes, etc. Laxity on the part of just one department or dereliction of duty 
by a few officials can hold-up the entire project. So, these projects are highly vulnerable to 
delays caused by all kinds of organizational failures. The same is the case with projects in 
civil aviation, shipping and ports, and power sectors, though to a lesser extent. Majority of 
projects  these sectors too involve construction or setting of network points. In several 
cases, ecologically sensitive land has to be acquired. This means more regulations and 
increased vulnerability to inter-organizational failures.
 But, how can we measure the implications of these failures? 
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One may be tempted to apply the above arguments regarding delays and cost overruns to 
some other sectors too; like telecom and atomic energy, petroleum and petrochemicals, 
mines, etc. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 2, project types in these and other sectors 
are too heterogeneous to be amenable to  valid  statistical inferences. Moreover, several 
projects in these sectors involve purchase of machinery and equipments. Such projects 
 
 
 However, if organizational failures mentioned here is a major underlying cause for delays, 
then compared to other sectors,  projects  in  road, railways,  urban-development, civil 
aviation, shipping and ports, and power sectors should exhibit longer time overruns. To test 
this hypothesis, we introduce dummy variables called DRRU for road, railways and urban-
development projects, and DCSPP for projects in civil aviation, shipping and ports, and 
power sectors.  In view of our arguments dummy variables DRRU and DCSPP can serve as 
proxies of organization failures. As argued earlier, road, railways and urban-development 
sectors are more homogeneous and initial contracts for projects in these sectors are more 
incomplete than is the case with projects in civil aviation, shipping and ports, and power 
sectors. That is why separate dummies have been used.   
 
In the following, I will show that delays regardless of their source are a major and 
statistically significant cause of cost overruns. This implies that the organizational failures 
also cause cost overruns through delays. They may have a direct effect too. Every 
department involved in project planning and implementation can suggest changes in project 
works, and hence can contribute to cost escalations.  
 
Similarly, if a project spans across more than one state, it has to deal with the concerned 
departments in each state. Therefore, projects spanning across multiple states seem more 
susceptible to inter-organizational failures. To test this hypothesis, we introduce another 
dummy variable called DSTATES.  
 
To sum up, if organizational failures are a significant cause of delays and cost overruns, 
then multistate, road, railways and urban-development, civil aviation, shipping and ports, 
and power sector projects should exhibit relatively long delays and high cost overruns.  
 
                                                 
16 See Lok Sabha (2006), LEA (2008) and quarterly reports of MOSPI. 
17 For a case study of Dhamra Port expansion project see Jonston and Santillo (2007).  
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don’t have to suffer from the above organizational failures.  Still, it will be interesting to 
study some of these sectors. So, we will use dummies DTA for telecom and atomic energy 
projects, and DPP for petroleum and petrochemical sector projects, respectively. 
 
Time Overruns: Logically, any delay in implementation in itself should cause cost overrun 
for the project. This should happen simply on account of inflation itself. In most cases, 
initial cost estimates are arrived at using the current input prices. If there are delays, inputs 
will become more expensive and, in turn, will cause an increase in the project cost. 
Moreover, certain overhead costs have to be met as long as the project remains incomplete. 
Delays should increase these costs also. Also, a long delay may cause depreciation of 
project assets, necessitating expenses on repairs or replacements. This means that in 
addition to the above factors,  time overrun  on account of any other factor  is  also  an 
underlying cause for cost overruns. 
 
Economic Factors: Each project is located in some state(s). Several departments of the 
state government concerned play rather crucial role in project implementation. After all, 
activities like land-acquisition, shifting of utilities, etc., are performed by the state 
government concerned. Moreover, economic and geographical features of the state may 
affect the project time and costs. For example, if a state has better transport, power and 
telecommunication infrastructure in place, it will be easy to execute projects in the state. 
Generally, richer states are said to be in possession of superior infrastructure. In contrast, 
due to law and order as well as difficult terrain, project implementation is likely to be 
difficult in the North-Eastern states and Jammu and Kashmir. To check statistical validity 
of these conjectures, states have been clubbed in four categories. Five richest states, in 
terms of per-capita income, are  grouped together.
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The arguments in the previous section show that several factors cause delays and at the 
same time cost overruns. Such scenario warrants use of a simultaneous-equation model in 
which the time and the cost overruns are endogenous variables, jointly dependent on the 
explanatory variables introduced in the previous section. But, the relationship between the 
time overrun and the cost overrun for a project needs to be discussed further. As argued in 
Section 4, any delay in implementation in itself will cause cost overrun for the project. This 
means that ‘time overrun’, among others, is an explanatory variable for ‘cost overrun.’ In 
contrast, cost overrun per-se does not imply time overrun. Suppose, there is an increase in 
project cost due to inflation. There is no reason why such a cost overrun per-say should 
lead to a delay in the implementation.
  These are Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, 
Gujarat and Maharashtra. We have used dummy DMRICH for these states. In the next 
category, we have four  southern states:  Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu. These states have well above average per-capita GSDP and are considered to be 
better governed. For these the dummy used is DRICH. In the third category we have the 
North-Eastern states and Jammu and Kashmir with dummy DNE.  
 
5. A Simultaneous Equation Model and its Results 
 
19
                                                 
18 The ranking has been arrived at by taking average of constant price per-capita SGNP for three years from 
2004-05 to 2006-07 we have used EPW for this purpose. Shetty (2003) has shown that during 1980s and 90s 
the ranking of states in terms of per-capita income did not change much.  
19 Cost escalation can cause delays, one may argue, if there are not enough funds available for the project. 
However, examination of MOSPI reports by the author shows that in most cases the actual expenditures have 
been less than the project outlays. Therefore, delays cannot be attributed to the shortage of funds. Moreover, 
lack of funds seems to be serious issue only for railways projects. See quarterly MOSPI reports. 
 Therefore, between the time overrun and the cost 
overrun, the causation seems to run from the former to the latter, not the other way round.  
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Moreover, time overrun also  manifests  the  underlying effect  of several factors not 
considered above. For example, delays on the part of the contractor, etc. These factors also 
cause cost overrun through time overrun. So, for our purpose the relevant model is the 
following simultaneous-equation model.       
 
t t t t INTIALCOST TIMELAPSE TIMELAPSE RUN PCTIMEOVER 3
2
2 1 0 α α α α + + + =
t t t t t
t t t t t
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ε α α α α
α α α α α
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(2) 
Remember, the dependent variables are percentage cost overrun (PCCOSTOVERRUN) 
and percentage time overrun (PCTIMEOVERRUN). The explanatory variables along with 
their expected signs and the relevant causes have been discussed in Section 4. Data sources 
have already been provided in Section 2.   The following Tables  3 and 4 provide  the 
relevant statistics about the variables and the dummies used. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for variables.       Table 4: 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev. 
PCGECOSTOVRRN  -3.65769  45.97005 
PCGETIMEOVRRN  51.72642  60.49127 
TIMELAPSE  40.46667  50.65964 
2 TIMELAPSE   4200.459  4470.295 
INITIALCOST  219.7263  344.3501 
IMPLPHASE  42.20408  20.67688 
 
 
The two error terms in equations (1) and (2) were tested for any correlation between the 
two. The null hypothesis that the two errors are correlated was strongly rejected, 
i.e., 0 ) , cov( 2 1 = t t ε ε . This means  the model specified in (1) and (2) is actually a  fully 
recursive simultaneous-equation model. Therefore, we can apply OLS estimation technique 
to each equation individually to get consistent estimates (see Green, 2008; Ch 13).  
 
The dataset has been treated for outliers and influential observations which resulted into 
dropping of 159 observations.
20
                                                 
20 In order to identify outliers, Studentized residuals were predicted and observations having absolute value 
greater than 2 were dropped. To identify influential points STATA’s in built command for calculating 
leverage of each observation, DFITS, DFBETA,WELSCH DISTANCE and COVRATIO were used. ( See 
Belsley, et al, 1980)  
 For the remaining 735 projects also the two error terms 
were found  uncorrelated with each other. The regression results  for these  projects  are 
presented in Tables 5. A close look at the dropped 159 outliers shows that some of these 
projects have very long positive time overruns and simultaneously huge but negative cost 
overrun. For instance, there are 40 odd projects with time overrun of 20 percent or more 
Dummy  Number of 
projects 
DRRU  261 
DCSPP  181 
DTA  31 
DPP  104 
DSTATES  62 
DMRICH  191 
DRICH  195 
DNE  24 
Total  894  
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and negative cost overruns of at least 70 percent. This means that if, for example, the 
initially estimated cost was Rs 100 crore, the actual cost turned out to be less than Rs 30 
crore, even though the project has suffered from delays! No convincing explanation can be 
provided to rationalize saving at this scale, that too by government officials. Similarly, 
there are many projects with large negative time overrun and simultaneously with huge and 
positive  cost overrun. Indeed, for many projects in the dataset the time and the cost 
overruns figures appear to be rather incredible. I can think of only two possible 
explanations for these implausible observations. Most probably these are instances of 
reporting/typing errors. Alternatively, it could be that during the implementation phase the 




 In either case, such projects are potentially hazardous. 
 
TABLE 5: Regression Results*.  
PCGETIMEOVRRN 






PCGETIMEOVRRN        0.1804      0.000   
      [0.0309]        
TIMELAPSE  -0.7649  0.000  -0.3615      0.000   
[0.0638]     [0.0604]        
2 TIMELAPSE  
0.0031  0.000  0.0032      0.000   
[0.0006]     [0.0005]        
INITIALCOST  -0.0077  0.124  0.0053        0.096   
[0.0050]     [0.0032]        
IMPLPHASE  -1.3328  0.000  0.4635      0.000   
[0.1717]     [0.1237]        
DRRU  40.8908  0.000  42.2939      0.000   
[5.3214]     [4.4655]        
DCSPP  18.9439  0.000  24.3207      0.000   
[5.2645]     [3.9731]        
DTA  108.8696  0.000  -10.3845      0.136       
[17.8039]     [6.9493]        
DPP  -8.2850  0.184  16.0656      0.000   
[6.2304]     [4.0655]        
DSTATES  -11.9754  0.026  3.8990      0.385       
[5.3651]     [4.4822]        
DMRICH  -3.6562  0.441  -1.3504      0.706       
[4.7470]     [3.5835]        
DRICH  -5.8881  0.157  -5.9202      0.073       
[4.1581]    [3.2931]       
DNE  -5.0787  0.564  3.1613      0.676       
[8.7995]     [7.5694]        
CONSTANT  108.4437  0.000  -53.7083      0.000   
[10.1106]     [6.5581]        
Observations  735     735        
R-squared  0.3710  0.000    0.3928    0.000    
* White’s heteroscedastic consistent estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Guided by this concern and to check robustness of our claims and results, regressions were 
run for various somewhat ‘cleaner’ subsets of the entire dataset. Table A1 in the Appendix 
provides the BLUE estimates for the subset reached at by dropping all the projects with 
                                                 
21 For example, initially a 200 km road was to be built but finally it was decided to bring down the length to 
just 40 km. Clearly, a road project of 200 km is not comparable to the one covering just 40 Km.   
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time overruns of  % 40  and more, such as  % 50  etc., and at the same time with cost overrun 
of  % 40 −  and less, such as  % 45 − , etc.
22
% 40
 Besides, estimates were checked with various 
thresholds of less than as well as greater than the   limits. The results are very similar 
to those in Table A1.
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Most of our hypotheses have turned out to be correct. For all regressions, the trend variable 
TIMELAPSE has negative coefficient and is extremely significant at 1% for time as well as 
cost overrun equations. Besides, in both the equations, the coefficient of 
  Only the significance level for INITIALCOST shows small 
variations.  This outcome is not surprising since most  of  the  problematic projects are 
outliers and get dropped anyway. Moreover, results for the entire dataset of 894 projects 
are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.  Since, the entire set has many outliers Quantile 
regression is used for this set. Compared to OLS, the Quantile regression is less vulnerable 
to the effects of outliers. Results in Table A1 and Table A2 are very similar to those 
reported in Table 5, with respect to the major hypotheses presented in Section 4. Also, the 
coefficients of the variables are robust to the presence or absence of the dummies.   
Therefore, we can afford to be confident about the findings.  
 
2 TIMELAPSE  is 
positive and significant at 1%. These results imply that the downward trends for percentage 
time and cost overruns are statistically significant. Moreover, as predicted, the 
TIMELAPSE variable has a U-shape effect on delays and cost overruns. The coefficient of 
INTIALCOST in equation (2) is positive and significant at 10%. Though, the significance 
level is somewhat sensitive to the presence/absence of outliers and the ‘implausible’ figures 
discussed above. But, the variable continues to have explanatory power. However,  the 
coefficient of IMPLPHASE in equation (2) is positive and exceedingly significant at 1%. 
This means as implementation phase increases, cost overruns soar up not only in absolute 
terms but also in percentage terms. As predicted in Section 4, IMPLPHASE is a better 
proxy for contractual failures.  These results also  confirm our claim that poor project 
planning and the resulting contractual failures are statistically significant causes behind 
cost overruns observed in India. For equation (1), as expected, the coefficient of 
IMPLPHASE is negative and highly significant at 1%. The coefficient of INTIALCOST is 
negative but  insignificant. Therefore, as explained in Section 4, the main effect of the 
sloppy planning and contractual failures is to increase cost overruns; they do not matter that 
much for time overruns.
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The results also confirm our claim  that organizational failures are a significant cause 
behind delays and cost escalations. Indeed, in every regression, the proxies for 
organizational failures – DRRU and DCSPP – have come out to be positive and extremely 
significant for delays as well as cost overruns. That is, ceteris paribus the road, railways, 
  
 
As predicted, time overrun is one of the  important factors  behind cost overruns; the 
coefficient of PCTGTIMEOVERRUN is positive and extremely significant at 1% in all the 
regression run. This corroborates our assertion that regardless of the underlying reason, 
delays in implementation are a major cause of cost overruns. 
 
                                                 
22 While any threshold is arbitrary, figures showing % 40 − ,  % 45 − , etc. of cost overruns or time overruns 
are rather implausible. Therefore, it appears safe to exclude such projects on account of the reasons provided 
in the previous paragraph. 
23 After dropping of the observations with time overruns of  % 40 −  and less, and cost overrun  % 40 −  and 
less, the remaining observations were treated for outlier as explained above. The same procedure was 
followed with the other threshold limits. 
24 However, note that in equation (1) the dependant variable is percentage time overrun rather than the 
absolute value of the time overrun. Time overruns in absolute terms should increase with the project size.   
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urban-development projects have experienced relatively high percentage of time and cost 
overruns. The same is the case with civil aviation, shipping and ports, and power sector 
projects. Significance level of the dummy DSTATE is not robust to regression techniques 
and across various datasets used. As expected, dummies DTA and DPP have not shown 
any consistency regarding the delays. Compared to the residual category, Petroleum and 
petrochemical sector projects have experienced higher cost overruns. However, given the 
level of heterogeneity of in these sectors, one should not read too much in these results. 
Indeed, as Table A1 shows, telecom and atomic energy projects are either outliers or have 
unreasonable figures. 
 
As far as the relative performance of the States is concerned,  there are no significant 
variations across regions. Yet, the southern states seem to have performed better than the 
rest. Projects in these states have experienced a bit smaller cost overruns. The performance 
of north-eastern states and Jammu and Kashmir is not significantly and consistently worse 
than the other regions.  
 
Before concluding, let me make an observation. As Table 2 shows, most projects suffering 
from cost overrun have experienced delays. In contrast, there are a number of projects with 
delays but no cost overruns. In view  of our arguments on time overruns versus cost 
overruns, these figures are somewhat puzzling. It appears that these paradoxical figures are 
a result of somewhat different procedures used to calculate time and cost overruns. In terms 
of Figure 1, initial estimates of time and cost are made at time t=0, however the contract is 
awarded at t=1. Generally there are delays between t=0 and t=1. As a result, input prices at 
t=1 are significantly higher than at t=0. It appears that only cost estimates get revised 
upward at t=1, not the time estimates, and these revised cost figures are reported in official 
files. This indeed has been found to be the case with road projects. Moreover, since cost 
escalations necessitate additional funds,  so cost figures get revised to avoid audit 
objections; time, in contrast, appears to be a free good in government departments.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The following findings have emerged from the econometric analysis of the MOSPI data: 
First, since 1980s the delays and the cost overruns have declined. Cost overruns have 
systematically declined not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of project cost.  
Similar is the case with delays. However, the effect is U-shaped. Second, regardless of their 
source, delays are one of the crucial causes behind the cost overruns. Third, bigger projects 
have experienced much higher cost overruns compared to smaller ones. Fourth, percentage 
cost overruns also escalate with length of the implementation phase; ceteris paribus, the 
longer is the implementation phase, the higher are cost overruns in absolute as well as 
percentage terms. Fifth, compared to other sectors, projects from road, railways, urban-
development sectors, as well as those from civil aviation, shipping and ports, and power 
sectors have experienced much longer delays and significantly higher cost overruns. Sixth, 
compared to other states, projects located in southern states, Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu, have experienced somewhat shorter delays and lower cost overruns. 
Performance of rich states is not significantly better than that of the poorer states. 
 
The first five findings are statistically significant and robust to regression techniques as 
well as sample sizes. Each result is symptomatic of a set of underlying causes.  Below we 
discuss each finding and its policy implications in view of the relevant underlying causes.  
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The first finding shows that during the last three decades some learning-by-doing has taken 
place among government officials involved in project planning and implementation. This 
along with the technological advances has enabled officials to improve estimates of project 
time and cost.
25
The fifth finding is indicative of the organizational failures that have come to afflict the 
project implementation process. It shows that the organizational failures are a statistically 
significant cause of delays and cost overruns. In view of the arguments presented in Section 
4, relatively long delays and high cost overruns experienced by the road, railways, urban-
development, civil aviation, shipping and ports, and power  projects  are due  to  these 
failures. Some other results in the study also corroborate this finding. In fact, organizational 
failures frequently trigger yet another form of contractual failure. It is widely known that 
contract management during the construction phase is very important if delays are to be 
avoided. At present, construction contracts are generally awarded even before the required 
land for the project is acquired. Similarly, utilities are shifted during the construction phase. 
Invariably, several departments are involved in approving and the actual shifting of power, 
water and sewer lines and other the utilities. Government agencies rarely do what they are 
required to do, but can use cobweb of complicated rules and procedures to pass the blame 
 However, the finding also reveals that the effect of cost overrun reducing 
learning and innovations has declined over time. Some policy interventions are urgently 
called for.  
 
The policy implication of the second result is immediate. Measures are immediately called 
for to avoid delays at each stage; from project approval, to awarding of contract, to its 
implementation. In what follows, while discussing the remaining findings, I will propose 
some of the steps that can help in the matter.  
 
Coming to the third  and the fourth  findings,  the  analysis shows that  due to imperfect 
techniques and contractual incompleteness some delays and cost overruns are inevitable. 
Besides, some of the cost overruns can be attributed to inflationary fluctuations. To that 
extent delays and cost overruns do not reflect wastage of resources. However, delays and 
cost overruns are too frequent and too large to be explained by the imperfect techniques, 
contractual incompleteness  and the inflationary fluctuations.  The  third and the fourth   
findings in view of the pertinent discussion in Section 4 imply that the defective planning 
and contractual failures  are  largely  responsible for cost overruns  and consequently for 
wastage of public resources.  Several measures can be helpful. For instance, to the extent 
possible, policy makers should avoid planning for large and big-cost projects. Similarly, 
planning of projects with long  implementation phase  is problematic.  Such projects are 
vulnerable to future uncertainties, deterioration in project assets and the inflation. Wherever 
possible the project size as well as the implementation phase should be kept small. Projects 
that have to be inevitably large should be planned and implemented with utmost care.  
 
However, the project planning process itself needs a radical overhaul. Rather than paying 
higher cost later on, it is worth investing resources to have more precise initial estimates of 
project time and cost. Moreover, wherever possible fixed-price rather than unit-price EPC 
contracts should be used. Under the commonly employed cash  EPC contracts neither 
government officials nor the contractors have incentives to take the contracts seriously. As 
a result, contracts are vague at the time of signing and poorly managed afterwards, leading 
to delays and cost overruns. 
 
                                                 
25 This result supplements findings that performance of public sector as a whole has improved since mid 
1980s (see Nagaraj, 2006).  
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for delays on each other. So much so that even if the delay is caused by the contractor it is 
almost impossible to punish him. Since contractor can easily prove a contributory 
negligence on the part of one or some  other department. This explains why contracts are 
rarely terminated, even when contractors cause prolonged delays. Several measures can 
help on this front too. For example, if activities like land acquisition and shifting of utilities 
can be completed either before or within a pre-scheduled time after the award of contract, 
the contractors can be put on high powered incentives to deliver on time and quality.  
 
Coming to the sixth finding, there is perception that due to superior infrastructure and 
better governance, the public delivery system is better in richer states. However, contrary to 
popular perception, this finding shows that the performance of richer states is not any better 
than the rest of the country.  Though, the projects located in the Southern states have 
exhibited a bit lower cost overruns. 
 
The above conclusions are relevant for the present official policies toward infrastructure. 
Policy makers seem to be keen to privatize the funding, management and ownership of 
infrastructure facilities. While an outright privatization has invited strong protests from 
several quarters, the PPPs have become politically acceptable channel  of transferring 
management and ownership rights to private firms.  The 11
th  five-year plan  crucially 
depends on private sector participation in infrastructure. The problems of delays and cost 
overruns with the public delivery systems are being used to justify privatization of public 
goods and services. However, our results imply that a change in ownership in itself cannot 
mitigate all the problems with the supply and administration of infrastructure facilities. 
After all, even PPP projects have to be initially planned by government officials. PPP 
projects are equally  vulnerable to some of the contractual and organizational  failures 
discussed above. Projects for upgradation of Delhi and Mumbai airports, construction of 
Bangalore Metro Train and for Delhi-Gurgaon Expressway are some of the cases in point. 
These are all PPP  projects and have experienced major delays  and cost overruns.  In 
contrast, the contractual and institutional approach adopted by the DMRC for the 
construction of Delhi Metro is worth emulating. Most of its projects have been completed 
on time and within budget.  Interestingly,  the  DMRC has  adopted some aspects of the 
approach suggested above.  
 
I would like to conclude with a few remarks on the findings of this paper. The results and 
conclusions  are  relevant  to all infrastructure projects, regardless of the sector and the 
project type. However, generality always comes at a cost. Apart from the issues discussed 
here, there are sector-specific issues also that impinge on delays and cost overruns.  The 
present study has ignored such issues.  For a better understanding of the causes behind 
delays and cost overruns, it will be useful to supplement this work with sector-specific 
analyses. Sector-specific studies may allow testing of additional hypotheses. For example, 
it may become feasible  to evaluate the comparative performance of different types of 
contracts, say acquisition versus construction contracts, PPP versus Non-PPP contracts, etc. 
Besides, though the results seem robust enough, still it will be useful to explore the reasons 
behind the doubtful figures on delays and cost overruns (such as, reporting errors), and 












Table A1: Regression results.*  
Variables  PCGETIMEOVERRUN 
(% Time Overrun)  P - value  PCGECOSTOVRRN 
(% Cost Overrun)  P - value 
PCGETIMEOVRRN     
 
0.2429  0.000 
    [0.0369] 
TIMELAPSE 
 












  [0.0006]  [0.0006] 
INITIALCOST 
 




  [0.0049]  [0.0030] 
IMPLPHASE 
 




  [0.1681]  [0.1220] 
DRRU 
 




  [5.3430]  [4.5982] 
DCSPP 
 









dropped   
     
DPP 
 
-4.7462  0.455 
 
14.6585  0.000 
 
[6.3433]  [4.0358]   
DSTATES 
 
-11.8610  0.027 
 
1.7636  0.691 
 
[5.3573]  [4.4294]   
DMRICH 
 
-5.7687  0.206 
 
0.0901  0.980 
 
[4.5601]  [3.6606]   
DRICH 
 
-3.5852  0.389 
 
-5.4182  0.114 
 
[4.1605]  [3.4273]   
DNE 
 
-4.1623  0.644 
 
5.1536  0.438 
 
[8.9883]  [6.6445]   
CONSTANT 
 
101.7805  0.000 
 
-54.8966  0.000 
 
[10.0440]  [6.4634]   
Observations  672    672   
R-squared  0.3207  0.000  0.4283  0.000 
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Variables  PCGETIMEOVRRN 
(%Time Overrun) 
p-value  PCGECOSTOVRRN 
(%Cost Overrun) 
p-value  
PCGETIMEOVRRN        0.0257  0.000 
      [0.0073]    
TIMELAPSE  -0.6558  0.000  -0.5347  0.000 
[0.0403]     [0.0211]    
2 TIMELAPSE   0.0029  0.000  0.0044  0.000 
[0.0005]     [0.0002]    
INITIALCOST  -0.0008  0.814  0.0023   0.165 
[0.0033]     [0.0017]    
IMPLPHASE  -0.9046  0.000  0.2473  0.000 
[0.0433]     [0.0226]    
DRRU  36.7614  0.000  42.1693  0.000 
[5.7493]     [2.9710]    
DCSPP  17.0066  0.008    19.9639  0.000 
[6.3534]     [3.2765]    
DTA  124.9216  0.000  -13.5074  0.005 
[8.9962]     [4.7953]    
DPP  -6.4807  0.384  14.0290  0.000 
[7.4378]     [3.8430]    
DSTATES  -7.7387  0.267  6.2275  0.084 
[6.9621]     [3.6050]    
DMRICH    2.3849  0.650  -3.9707  0.144 
[5.2572]     [2.7129]    
DRICH  -1.3095  0.801  -3.6842  0.171 
[5.1935]    [2.6890]   
DNE  4.3152  0.612  15.4589  0.000 
[8.4949]     [4.4202]    
CONSTANT    78.4338  0.000  -34.8407  0.000 
[5.9022]     [3.0972]    
Observations  894     894    
Pseudo R2      0.1595    0.1748    
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TABLE 3A Summary Statistics: State-wise details of Delays and cost overruns in infrastructure projects 
during April1992-March 2009.  




Projects  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
All India  5  22.94  78.70  -50.17  157.68  117.50  147.55  21.21  378.13 
Andaman & 
Nicobar 
Islands  2  320.54  358.98  66.70  574.38  6.77  14.00  -3.13  16.67 
Andhra 
Pradesh  91  -12.94  47.67  -99.73  143.39  62.93  104.02  -33.33  542.86 
Arunachal 
Pradesh  3  153.22  200.31  -52.95  347.10  95.66  47.32  45.83  140.00 
Assam  29  51.25  146.52  -49.62  588.95  69.70  62.87  -9.68  275.00 
Bihar  31  32.49  92.74  -61.95  443.98  90.04  104.61  -4.76  359.57 
Chhattisgarh  20  -19.51  30.24  -91.85  44.99  21.36  41.75  -93.33  100.00 
Delhi 
  35  19.65  82.34  -98.40  279.46  183.40  250.58  0.00  1200.00 
ER 
  2  30.70  47.70  -3.03  64.43  28.59  11.43  20.51  36.67 
Goa  5  -6.74  61.09  -90.37  65.68  93.06  43.92  37.04  138.46 
Gujarat  54  12.09  99.03  -93.37  534.37  58.69  74.68  -41.38  314.29 
Haryana  12  32.72  115.73  -46.68  368.82  68.43  115.44  -19.67  366.67 
Himachal 
Pradesh  4  105.18  181.27  -16.94  373.86  100.07  93.73  -6.67  217.65 
Jammu & 
Kashmir  7  517.73  972.22  -60.86  2603.96  95.78  66.16  22.08  202.08 
Jharkhand  20  -12.49  45.97  -64.84  136.75  176.91  441.10  -5.13  2033.33 
Karnataka  34  5.93  60.22  -80.32  265.12  81.28  186.52  -10.96  1100.00 
Kerala  15  13.42  68.99  -72.89  190.97  98.33  129.42  -11.90  500.00 
Madhya 
Pradesh  43  -11.79  56.26  -99.32  207.83  29.62  75.61  -62.50  397.14 
Maharashtra  125  -14.42  45.48  -91.93  238.82  100.05  241.86  -42.68  2150.00 
Manipur  2  170.26  279.70  -27.52  368.03  274.45  199.57  133.33  415.56 
Mizoram  1  -26.84  .  -26.84  -26.84  59.09  .  59.09  59.09 
Multi City  4  11.09  88.20  -72.38  132.91  147.11  104.12  86.67  302.78 
NR or North 
East 
States/region  10  -0.13  63.52  -67.51  166.82  67.53  86.24  -10.00  220.00 
Nagaland  3  254.89  315.87  -9.07  604.85  109.32  55.71  70.83  173.21 
Orissa  52  10.11  115.11  -74.90  735.33  61.54  69.46  -18.18  305.56 
Punjab  10  33.44  84.47  -69.00  193.69  83.19  78.07  -14.29  232.91 
Rajasthan  24  -1.55  50.72  -53.68  216.77  38.14  75.05  -13.64  356.52 
SR  3  -22.39  4.41  -26.84  -18.03  12.27  24.95  -4.17  40.98 
Sikkim  4  31.85  72.55  -32.14  136.16  31.51  34.10  -2.44  75.38 
Tamil Nadu  61  -5.41  68.05  -93.86  331.09  98.73  163.71  -10.00  1075.00 
Tripura  4  25.30  24.60  2.54  55.34  80.94  79.26  11.48  162.50 
Uttar Pradesh  59  19.58  85.41  -78.69  377.24  51.90  55.35  -25.00  237.50 
Uttaranchal  4  59.63  133.40  -64.82  178.91  151.73  158.86  -9.76  366.67 
WR 
states/region  4  -23.02  36.78  -61.19  19.97  21.01  67.16  -25.00  120.83 
West Bengal  53  32.93  104.15  -56.60  527.56  79.17  72.87  -27.78  405.26 
Spans in more 
than one state  59  50.01  176.51  -61.83  1287.98  64.04  80.92  -100.00  408.70 
                   
Total  894  25.17  132.273  -99.73  2603.96  79.19  153.56  -100.00  2150.00 
*. For all projects in a sector 
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PCGECOSTOVRRN  1                
PCGETIMEOVRRN  0.2561  1             
TIMELAPSEMONTHS  -0.3478  -0.1936  1          
TIMELAPSESQMONT
HS  -0.154  -0.0639  0.7726  1       
INITIALCOST  -0.008  -0.1509  -0.0052  -0.0149  1    
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